Saturday, March 12, 2011

What was Keynes' view of "too big to fail...?"

In short, tax, confiscate and legally reform all such excesses back to sane and functional systems, benefitting the greater society far more equitably__Just as FDR did in the `30's, by instituting many of Keynes' ideas, then...

Suggested modern updates by Davidson, as a modern extension of Keynes' ideas... (This is a much more complex system than represented here. It is not a single global currency system, as may be interpreted. All nations maintain local currency. It's only for international trade and financial transactions' management__the real problem area, which also includes self-liquidating national debts, and major local subsidiarity improvements, allowing future sustainability... This is the same system Plato first suggested some 2400 years ago__'All have eyes and ears, but practically none see and listen...")

“Elsewhere(Davidson) I have developed in detail a proposal for reforming the entire international payments system via an international clearing union that provides for capital controls and other necessary and sufficient conditions to permit the establishment of a golden age in the 21st century. The main proviso of my proposal are:

1. The unit of account and ultimate reserve asset for international liquidity is the International Money Clearing Unit (IMCU). All IMCU's are held only by central banks, not by the public.

2. Each nation's central bank is committed to guarantee one way convertibility from IMCU deposits at the clearing union to its domestic money. Each central bank will set its own rules regarding making available foreign monies (through IMCU clearing transactions) to its own bankers and private sector residents(21). Ultimately, all major private international transactions clear between central banks' accounts in the books of the international clearing institution.

3. The exchange rate between the domestic currency and the IMCU is set initially by each nation -- just as it would be if one instituted an international gold standard.

4. Contracts between private individuals will continue to be denominated into what ever domestic currency permitted by local laws and agreed upon by the contracting parties.

5. An overdraft system to make available short-term unused creditor balances at the Clearing House to finance the productive international transactions of others who need short-term credit. The terms will be determined by the pro bono clearing managers.

6. A trigger mechanism to encourage a creditor nation to spend what is deemed (in advance) by agreement of the international community to be "excessive" credit balances accumulated by running current account surpluses. These excessive credits can be spent in three ways: (1) on the products of any other member of the clearing union, (2) on new direct foreign investment projects, and/or (3) to provide unilateral transfers (foreign aid) to deficit members.

7. A system to stabilize the long-term purchasing power of the IMCU (in terms of each member nation's domestically produced market basket of goods) can be developed. This requires a system of fixed exchange rates between the local currency and the IMCU that changes only to reflect permanent increases in efficiency wages.(22) This assures each central bank that its holdings of IMCUs as the nation's foreign reserves will never lose purchasing power in terms of foreign produced goods, even if a foreign government permits wage-price inflation to occur within its borders.

8. If a country is at full employment and still has a tendency towards persistent international deficits on its current account, then this is prima facie evidence that it does not possess the productive capacity to maintain its current standard of living. If the deficit nation is a poor one, then surely there is a case for the richer nations who are in surplus to transfer some of their excess credit balances to support the poor nation.(23) If it is a relatively rich country, then the deficit nation must alter its standard of living by reducing the relative terms of trade with major trading partners. If the payment deficit persists despite a continuous positive balance of trade in goods and services, then there is evidence that the deficit nation might be carrying too heavy an international debt service obligation. The pro bono officials of the clearing union should bring the debtor and creditors into negotiations to reduce annual debt service payments by [1] lengthening the payments period, [2] reducing the interest charges, and/or [3] debt forgiveness.(24)”