Tri-Chronic Dimensional Geometric Logic, and Tri-Chronic Spatial Perception…

“Logic is rooted in the social principle.” Charles Sanders Peirce

“No man can communicate the smallest item of information to his brother-man unless they have … common familiar knowledge; where the word `familiar’ refers less to how well the object is known than the manner of knowing … Of course, two endless series of knowings are involved.” C.S. Peirce

(Note: Please excuse the ego in this post. Just trying to get new ideas on the web to protect copyrights)

Is there any reason in 2008 we should be held hostage of individual knowledge, by the modern advancement of technology, complexity and computerization of our financial systems? Should, “We the people”, be treated good and bad by the history of capitalism’s evolution, at differing times through history? What is it exactly, that causes our wealth and poverty cycles? Can this question be truthfully and logically answered?

I say, “It can”, but it will take a journey you probably have not expected, to explain it. Recent readings in the field of philosophy, semantics and pragmatism have convinced me to take an alternative look at political economics, through the eyes of some of histories greatest minds, such as Socrates, Plato, Christaan Huygens, Euler, Locke, Kant, Tom Paine, Alexander Hamilton, Peirce, Veblen, Einstein, Wittgenstein, Keynes, Paul Einzig, John Nash, S. Hawking, Jaakko Hintikka, Paul Davidson and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. Veiws I held no more than three months ago are gone, having been replaced by the inductive logic in the above title, which I discovered over some three years ago, yet only worked up recently. This new logic is in line with the above thinkers, yet includes my extensions. I intend to present this below, yet only in its bare semantic form, as I believe the world needs simpler explanations than academics has thus far treated them. After a brief summary of the above thinkers, leading to my ideas, I’ll fully lay out the above mentioned tri-systems of logic and perception.

My thought is founded in a life of economics, physics and philosophic study. Through the years I’ve found Plato to be the most valuable of the ancients, even though I do like Heraclitus, and do respect Aristotle’s ethics, but as to epistemic validity, Plato wins `hands down’ to me. It’s only Plato who can fit the modern ideas of triadic logics’ semioses, as espoused first by Charles Sanders Peirce, at the turn of the end of the 19th century. Only Plato’s mind line, A, D, B, C, E offers a similar structure as laid out by Peirce, yet not fully interpreted then, as Peirce later would, yet a full interpretation of Plato, into its triadic dynamics of common grounds, the abstract scientifics of forms and archetypes, and “noesis” clearly relates very closely to Peirce’s triadic systems of semantics and pragmatics. At least I have no problem seeing the links. All one needs realize is, the forms of thought and archetypes are not the exaggerated idealisms most of academics have thought, for far too many centuries___It’s simple scientific abstractions of what Kant called the `space that moves lines’ in the mind, when using abstract thought. It’s the reality of the mind mechanics, of how simple abstraction necessarily works.

Before I proceed, I’ll give a few examples. Just imagine a room full of seats as in an auditorium. In this room sitting in one corner is you, and say 20 seats to your left and 20 in front, squared. Now, close your eyes and imagine a solid steel basketball suspended in mid-air. With your mind’s abstract imagination, move the ball up and down, then toss it to the corner left seat. Now to the further left front seat and back to yourself, and catch it, then levitate it. This is all possible in abstract imagination, but how are you moving the ball? With what? This is the profound idea Whitehead, I believe, discovered about Kant’s theorizing. Our intuitive will is actually capable of manipulating internal space___photons? Now, to make the point further, imagine a neoprene golf ball in the same scenario. Take the heavy solid steel basketball and merge/morph it inside the golf ball, without the golf ball increasing in size. That is a representation of isomorphic quantum physics, which is beyond the scope of this article, but the mind can accomplish such feats___Yet How? I’ll leave this for later, as I’m only trying to put your mind in inter-relational order, to relay the logic information of this article…

Next, I’d like to take up Descartes’ synthetic doubt, as that’s clearly all it was, yet it still has many major philosophers arguing over him. The separation of mind and body is the greatest piece of meditation non-sense I’ve ever come across, that’s been put across as something rational to think about, when there’s actually no rationality there___possible. Just think about it, how would one think without a body/brain to store perception’s necessary actions for mind to think? Where would the physical given of thought rest without the necessary brain’s memory storage areas, as we know these physically exist in the brain, which modern medicine’s neuro-scientific tests have proven, to think with? What is a mind without a brain? Do you see my point yet? One way or the other, it’s pure meta-physical nonsense, and this is not to criticize metaphysics, per say, as I have nothing against people’s desired beliefs. There may be some separation between brain and mind functions, as I do admit this also, but there’s no total or real separation, as one can’t function without the other. Just think about it again, “What’s a mind going to think about, without any physical reality? Zero? Nothing? Na da?” The black zone got no thoughts___period! So, let the skeptics have their non-sense…

Now, let’s look at someone more sensible like Huygens and Euler, the great mathematicians of early probability logic and combinatorics/calculus/algebra formula simplifications, since they didn’t delve into the synthetic metaphysical as far as Descartes did. Without the foundations of modern math resting on these two giants, and the three Arabic actuators and transmitters, Al-Khwarizmi, Avicenna, Biruni and others’ additions to the Greeks, Persians and Egyptians, we’d all look rather foolish. Yes, maybe others would have come along, but that’s pure speculation, and Huygens’ probability laws would be highly prejudiced against such views, IMO. Without Huygens and Euler, we may never have had a genius like J. Gibbs inventing statistical probability mechanics and vector mathematics, then Maxwell would have been put off for years, as well as Boltzman, Planck and Einstein, then where would we be? Some may say better off, but that’s naive. From Huygens and Euler I’ve been able to use X/X for representing completely new understandings of universal entropy and equilibrium, which works extremely well for economics central choice axiom(SCM, which requires extensive dynamic updating), and logic’s central choice axiom, of indifferent necessity choice___More on this later when I get up to Hintikka and Pietarinen.

I do have a scientific method to my madness, believe it or not, and it’s stated in the first quote at the beginning of this paper, “Logic is rooted in the social principle.” Charles Sanders Peirce. As a matter of fact, all my thinking is grounded in Peirce’s thought and logic processes, especially his classification architecture, along with my 40 years experience working in logic tables, but I do give credit to many other greats of history, especially those mentioned in the second paragraph. Plato, Paine and Hamilton figure greatly in my reasoning of sorting the realities involved between the “Semantic Web”, and the “Pragmatic Web” evolving into a “Knowledge Web”, or S-Web -> P-Web -> K-Web, as per Pietarinen. IMO, Plato and A. Hamilton are the two earliest greatest economists, as I have mentioned in previous posts, and America’s democracy may not even have been possible without Paine’s contributions to the S-Web and P-Web, of the times, which has greatly contributed to the nation’s and the world’s long march toward a possible and desired universal non-violent liberty. Barach Obama put it best, “The creed written into our founding document declares our destiny”. Without the work of Tom Paine, we may never have had a country to enjoy such privileges, as his pamphlets were read aloud in many towns, by a town crier, since many could not read. This is one of history’s greatest examples where the semantic web(if I’m allowed to be so liberal with meaning) contributes to the pragmatic web of our and the entire world’s reality, and it was all greatly made possible by one man, yet most of academics wants to forget the greatness of this powerful common man, of “Common Sense”. I can’t. I give him the credit due, yet without the perspicacious mind of Hamilton to follow, we’d have been a sad economic basket-case. BTW, you’ll find much the similar semantic style in the “Federalist Papers” where written by Hamilton(Plubius), as used by Paine.

The next two important men in my evolution are Peirce and his student T. Veblen, and I might mention why all these men I’m crediting are as great as they are___They were all of great eclectic inductive intellects and had other wide ranging interests, as well. That’s why such others not on my list are not credited, as they are all particularists, and I choose the universalists over the particularists, as the mind works best outside-in, first, and not inside-out, first, as many may want, i.e., induction over deduction. Though Aristotle and Kant make my list, as does Wittgenstein, as he was the first to mention “diachronic logic”, which plays a very important place in the history of logic. Though I’d roughly formed tri-chronic logic from reading Peirce, I fully grounded it after reading about Wittgenstein’s diachronic logic in Pietarinen, just last month, and then developed it further to include tri-spatial perception. Pietarinen’s statement, “semantics is parasitic on pragmatism over time”, or there abouts, also greatly contributed to the grounding abilities for my own tri-systems of thought. So, I thank all these great minds whose shoulders I stand on, and especially thank Wittgenstein for his clearness of logic views, even if at times, a bit over-strict and omniscient. Jaakko Hintikka also plays heavily in my thinking as he also is a lifelong student of Peirceian thought, and was the main professor Pietarinen studied and looked up to, as near as I can tell. Hintikka’s thought is profound, especially as relates to working on founding further logic progress on a proper method of scientific questioning, which is exactly what Peirce stated, more than 100 years ago. I also think his modal logic is more sound than Kripke’s, as to S-5, which I will later show how to prove with better social grounding, as per Peirce, using Euler through Einstein and Hawking. Our scientific progress is in the proper formation of the questions, just as Socrates stated in Plato’s works.

I am going to be controversial and state that John Locke’s “blank slate mind” is true, and not only for how we are born, but as is through-out our lives. That’s right___the mind is a blank slate. It has perception and logic agents and self-agency, but as to content, it draws all content into itself, from either outside or inside, from brain state agents and memory storage states, by way of the passive and active will, which is no more than our instinctual intuitive spirit, most likely housed in the reptilian brain stem, and connected from its three lobes, to the three lobe cerebellum, by the trigeminal nerve, which branches into the two halves of the brain___the mind/brain connections. BTW, both my wife and C.S. Pierce have and had trigeminal neuralgia, a very serious nerve injury, thus I’ve studied this function extensively, as my wife has suffered with it for over four years. Further I’ll state the most controversial idea of all, rationality does not exist in the mind___rationality is a brain state agent, most likely in the cerebellum, and must always be inducted/inferred into perception. This is the great mind/body problem solved, iff one simply realizes the entire agency of self must have two a priori agents, in order for one to question, and the other to answer___Reason asks the questions, and logic answers___In other words the mind answers the brain, and all reason and logic must be inducted/inferred in. If this doesn’t make sense, I don’t know what does.

Now, how does perception and logic function? Most would think, and most do think that logic, the knowing agent, does the thinking___Well it does do most of the higher order thinking, but not all by self-choice. If we first look at perception, we can better understand the knowing agent of epistemic logic. Just as Peirce stated, “Logic is rooted in the social principle”, and I couldn’t agree more. We know the common ground of being is the natural given___by this I simply mean we all see a tree, a bird, a house, a person or whatever, of the real ground of nature and man. When we first open our eyes from birth this perception process starts, is neutral/passive, and unstoppable if our eyes are open, and then stores these images in the memory storage areas of the brain, for later retrieval by the will. This is the natural common ground of all brain and mind states. It comes from both bio-nature and geo-universe as the equilibriated ground of all beings. I don’t think anyone would argue with the balance of the universe and nature___I sure can’t make that any better, and neither do I for a minute think anyone can, in its pre-human natural state. The problem with logic, looked at in perception, only starts with man first digging his way into Earth’s crust. This is where reason first starts questioning perception, and logic is necessarily required to answer___it’s just the dialogical necessity of brain/mind mechanics. So, when there’s conflict with nature, recognized by perception, reason and logic, brain and mind, must start co-operating to resolve the differences and dis-agreements of perception, as all logic is, is proper knowing___Proper Seeing, i.e., basic a priori perceptual instinct. Whether perception and logic are individual epistemic agents or not is beyond my ability to fully know, without self-deception entering the equation, even though I’ve studied all the models of perception and logic from all the different schools of epistemic philosophy, and my inner self-investigations. I see no reason why perception can not be logic, as a singleton. There’s just nothing else needed for the mind to know, as knowing is simply seeing the total triadic picture of tri-chronic logic and tri-spatial perception, which I’ll explain shortly. To me, it’s just logically necessary for perception to honor nature’s natural equilibriums, if it’s going to respect itself, and be responsible to finding the scientific truth of the agents and world epistemic agency, through the final semantics and pragmatic equilibrium, in future total knowledge, or our “ought” models of. If the will feeds perception/logic the proper images and ideas, true/false, good/bad, reason and logic dialogically can do their job, though logic does, at the same time, have the central choice to be dishonest___the Trickster element. But, if one is trying to be scientific, and abide by the method of responsibility and honesty to self-truth, perception/logic will by necessity, just as Hintikka has tried to prove with modal logic, yet unsuccessfully, so far, IMO, function necessarily honestly, when sense and reason ask it to do so___first order math and logic has never failed me yet, and I don’t expect it to. Yet with these pieces of information, and what’s to come, Hintikka may be able to prove his S-5 modal logic better.

Finally, to wrap this all up, here is the technical explanation of tri-chronic logic and tri-spatial perception. I’ll take the hardest unsolved problem in philosophy, morality, and prove its social scientific validity. I’ll also prove the necessary validity of the axiom of choice. I’ll further still prove the equilibrium axiom, X/X. All will be proved with tri-system Peirceian thinking, semantics, pragmatics and future empirical probability models of. Morality is based on the inter-subjective pre-personal analyzing of self in relation to other, in self-reflection. This requires deep self-reflective reasoning and logic semantics and dialogues. This is private language, just as Wittgenstein described it, and not accessible to outside investigation, but we all know we do just this, yet a first basis outside knowledge of this process can be represented by my wife’s quote; “Morality is as you see others morally see you.” That is an entirely objective observation of personal judgment, yet still a private language. Thus, we must observe a larger function of morality, in society, to have something tangible to, at the least, use primitive logic and math(least and greatest magnitudes) on. This is where we must use Peirce’s social principle of logic, which exhibits itself in our habits, which are publicly obvious and scientifically observable, thus mathematizable, even if with primitive math, as it’s all I need for this short paper. Everyone knows primitive maths are convertible to higher order Jevons, Peirce and Keynes’ probability maths and logics.

So far, we have a Wittgensteinian diachronic process we can install in the perception/logic agent, and have the separate epistemic agents of reason and logic dialogue about. The reason it’s diachronic is I’m using two different time periods of social moral action, and two different spatial areas___past and present. The reasoning agent also has access to the perception/logic agent. They function as the agency of brain/mind cooperation/transduction, even when reason, passions or any sense agent may be in conflict with perception/logic. In order to make this model a tri-chronic process of both logic/perception, we’ll need a three time-place event. Thus the model I’ll install in perception/logic is “past-present-future”, which is both time and place triadic specific, thus tri-chronic and tri-spacial. With a model of “was, is and ought” we can clearly see the dynamics of social moral function. First, I’ll have to convert/update morality to logic by simply renaming it in two ways, “The greatest comparative good for all concerned”, i.e., as to health and security”, and Plato’s “Best order of things”. Using these two simplicitors allows us to compare periods and places of moral social history, by using a simple Cartesian graph of +’s and –‘s on an x, y, c graph. Let the diagonal axis c, be the universal and natural balances of ground given system’s qualities, and the vertical axis x, be quantities, of man based moral actions. Also let the horizontal axis y, be time and place. That should be simple enough for explanation.

Next, let me state that morality can be time and place mathematically compared, as a social function over history and place/space. The functions are “greater good” and “best order”. Now, just ask, “Was woman treated better or worse in the past, compared to the present, and how might she be treated in the future, as based on a non-violent liberty function, and a future model of “ought?” This can be easily graphed with history’s existing database of facts and figures, thus mathematically axiologizing morality, in general terms, as to personal treatment. I’ve graphed this out elsewhere, and it’s a no-brainer___Woman was treated mathematically worse and more unfair in the past compared to today, and most likely will be treated better still in the future, "iff", the ought model holds for “greater good/best order”, which logic can accomplish, if it wishes, once the copula of the semantics web and the pragmatic web are breached, which this math and model does, by the linking copula being the inductive math proofs. The math works, for this model of tri-chronic logic and tri-spatial perception, and produces its proof by linking subjective sematic evolutional sense and actions, with objective pragmatic mathematical observations and facts. Also, other concepts such as responsibility, epistemic security, epistemic truth can be plugged in, in place of morality, to socially prove logic’s extended function mathematically, rationally and empirically___The Triadic Proof___X/X=1+E.(E is extension)

Next is the axiom of choice. Without the axiom of choice, the excluded middle in most logics, we couldn’t install a “was, is and ought” model in intuitive perception/logic, and we couldn’t use our basic natural instinctual a priori primitive logic to do the tri-chronic logic and tri-chronic perception semantical dialogics necessary to even describe this model’s function, yet I just have. Even though I’m only using diachronic logical math to do the actual graph’s pragmatic outputs, I could not have reasoned it out dialogically without the extended capacities of my Peirce type thought processes, therefore, the axiom of choice(and/or inductive intuitive included middle) is absolutely necessary in extended type logics, or un-restricted inter-relational first order logics, as Hintikka has stated, to solve society’s present complex problems. For, without scientific tri-chronic and tri-spatial models of logic and perception, we are intellectually handicapped, un-necessarily so. Peirce, Hintikka and Pietarinen are correct, and modern linguistics and logic studies are in need of serious updating, to the old, tried and true, Peirceian wisdom-visions___wisdom logic.

Next is the equilibrium axiom, X/X and also X/-X=1+EE, representing infinity divided by and to the true fundamental infinitesimals of total state space decay. The first formula comes from Euler, yet I’ve found a mathematical method for proving its value and validity, for economics and physics, if not many other fields of study, in an entirely new way. If we take Einstein’s formula E=MC^2, and convert it to E=F^tdC^2, where F is finity, and td represents total universal finite decay to its final state, if taken far enough over universal time and space, as per Stephen Hawking’s 10^137 years for total universal radiation decay, we are left, according to physics’ conservation law, “Matter and energy can never be destroyed, only converted”, then we have a final elemental matter/energy product/substance, of e/m waves, or photons, in the absolute entropy state of X/X equilibrium, which actually extends to X/X=1+E at absolute zero. This just happens to be an absolute scientific theoretical fact___Oxymoron? No. Just run a theoretical universal model backwards, with Whitehead’s 9 categorial obligations of quantum wave motion, and you have the reforming(Plato’s forms and archetypes of thought) of a new universe, iff, far enough out in infinity wave motion is most near still, then by the laws of quantum physics, it is thus required to be hydrodynamic___The Prime Mover. In order to understand total re-forming of X/X=1+EE(extension/entanglement) matter/energy, one only needs the known laws of quantum motion from random motions to uniform motions, and std. model physics laws, as they always apply to the entire universe, of all known and possibly knowable models. The implications for this are profound for physics’ models of our universe, but I’ll leave that for another time…

None of these three ideas, plus many others not mentioned, would have been possible without the extentions of dyadic logic and perception, to triadic logic and perception, or tri-chronic perception/logic, however you want it. The final word is that logic/perception can just as easily function triadically, just as Charles Sanders Peirce long ago tried to inform the world, and not only can it___It does!

Perception Is Seeing/Knowing/Wisdom…

How can I state this simply? Perception is nothing more than seeing, understanding and knowing, in its barest, and in it most essential states___It is pure mind. What is its barest state architecture and mechanics? Let’s speculate an answer. We know it produces geometrical representations, so it’s a geometricizer. We know it produces 3-D representations, so it’s a dimensionalizer. We know from Einstein the universe has four fundamental forces, so there’s two more, as these two may be represented as electro-magnetic and gravitizing. The next two forces are the strong and weak nuclear forces, and could easily fill the necessary positions of perception’s most complex quantum mechanics isomorphic friction and ergodicity, to further help the geometricizer and the dimensionalizer form representations, then we’d have a fully working mechanical perception system, self-sufficiently functioning. Of course, this is just a model, but it’s a highly possible model. Just close your eyes and picture a triangle, a square, a circle, etc., and watch how quick they form, and how quick you can resize them, or zoom them, then picture a red `72 GTO and try doing the same thing, without changing images. Use the same image and resize and zoom in and out with it. Is it as easy as the triangle, etc.? Why? Why not?

The world of academic and analytic philosophy has long assumed knowledge to be more complex than simple perception, but is it Really? When we travel back to Socrates’ dialogues in many of Plato’s works, we find knowledge to be admittedly no more than perception, so let me see if I can convince you it is no more than simple/complex perception, and nothing more. In recent years Jesse Prinz has written, “Beyond Appearances: The Content of Sensation and Perception”, which entirely agrees with my ideas of perception, and that is that all sense and perception can be represented entirely in perception. This is also in agreement with Socrates ideas, and many recent epistemologists, especially many female epistemologists. So why has the academic world so exaggerated the simple Ockham’s razor?

The most recent global debate is about “reification”, which isn’t really being related to perception, but since all knowledge applies to perception, it easily fits as a starting point of discussion. If we reify all our social and cultural belief systems, then why not apply reification to perception? I am going to. Due to the debate between the Bachtin Circle and the Habermas Groups, and others, centering attention on reification of each’s ideas, I’ll extend the debate to the reification processes that affect the perception and epistemological debates. All the differences over the last 2400 years are due to nothing but turning abstract speculations into pseudo-concrete beliefs, which is none other than reification, and is no more than the original abstract speculations, whether of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Hume, Habermas, Chompsky or others. It’s all classed as reification, if not fully grounded in logic, math and empirical experimental evidence.

Omniscient abstract speculations are no closer to the truth than was ancient mythology, as it can easily be refuted. Just try to think of something concrete, subjective or objective, that is not, or can not be represented in perception___I say it’s not possible, whether cognition, understanding, knowledge, wisdom, objects or any senses___We only know it all in perception, and we can know it no other way, just as Jesse Prinz has so aptly shown, and Socrates so long ago stated. All perception is inductive mechanics, either from the outside world first, then from memory storage areas second, and nothing more than inducted, deducted and transducted, back and forth between our perception and brain agents, by imaginations, epiphanies, metaphors, analogies, intuitions, hypotheses, or whatever else one wishes to induct into the total processes of abduction, as Peirce so long ago stated, and named it.

Perception___You want ground? Look at it. It’s the first universal ground of stars, galaxies, planets, moons, plasma clouds, etc., and second Ol’ Mother-Earth, nature, Mother-Wit and Common Sense___That’s it___That’s all… These grounds hold the original first matters, motions, mechanics, maths, geometries, equilibriums, ergodicities, isomorphicities, dimensions, greatest and least magnitudes, combinatorics, balances, best orders of things, what-ever___What more could we ask A-Priori logics, maths and laws to be founded in…? “You perceive the Firsts___You quench your Thirsts…” We realize we induct these in first, passively and necessarily, if we but open our eyes, and 90% of the perception/knowledge/wisdom battle is already won. The rest follows first inductions, and only final inductions will solve the, yet unsolved, universals and particulars…

The above isn’t to suggest perception is not a complex organ, as it is the most complex organ in the entire body. When one realizes all sense and intellectual mind functions must take place within perception, and also realizes the number of sense, reasoning and logic agents within the brain/mind complex, plus the entire differential/integral isomorphic actions of all these agents, sometimes functioning simultaneously, one quickly realizes the true power of perception___No number of computers on Earth can compare. This is one of the reasons Peirce had so much trouble developing a workable dialogical interpretation of said processes. Just think, the only man in the world, at the time, embarking on an entirely new path of triadic understanding, interpretation and exposing his scientific findings to a world of settled reified beliefs___Sort of like the American Indians finally coming to the realization, after it was too late, they had to trade their bow and arrows, for guns. No more difficult task exists than developing out of settled beliefs and habits of the given social contract, as the Indians prove, yet he achieved it, but only to be fully interpreted 100 years later, when all he was trying to accomplish was a new interpretation of simple and complex perception, and really little more.

Just think about it, can any of us step above this settled concrete power of the highly established academic views? I’d just like to state my interpretation of Peirce’s views about simple and complex perception… Abduction is the interpreter/action/agent of the transductions, of inductions and deductions, as a triadic system of simple and complex perception, all the while being all three in one. The aducer/abducer is always the interpreter/perception, whether operating in sense, reason or logic, as well as are sense, reason and logic as they morph and isomorphically change and trade places, in and out of perception, the true seat of all seeing, knowing and wisdom. This is why the triadic perception of “I” is so hard to sensibly describe, with any form of critical reason or logic. The transductive “I” perception is the interpreter/translator of induction and deduction into, away from, and back to abduction, “Mother-Wit” and “Common Sense”. Abduction is the triadic repeating processes of the many transductions between induction and deduction, before final inductions into the “Public Sphere”, either by hand, pen or tongue, as there is no other possible pragmatic action into the Public Sphere, except that famous “Ol’ Induction”. Deduction, transduction and abduction only take place within the mind, yet “Ol Induction” is everywhere___omnisciently existing___when thought, used, heard or spoken…

The simple absolutely grounded proof of the above is the overly obvious empirical evidence of all the world’s empires___Rise and Falls. It’s always emergent evolutionary induction up, and devolutionary deduction down. The wealth, intelligence and growth in and up, and the wealth, intelligence and growth out and down. Also, look at the last forty years analogies of America down and China up, etc., yes, there’s been fictitious wealth growth in America, but my analogy applies to real physical and sustained growth. There’s no larger proof of good induction, and bad deduction, on the face of the Earth, and if you don’t like the analogies, I suggest you update your understandings of the “Social Contracts” and the “Public Sphere”___as you can do nothing but induct into the “Public Sphere”, even if you try to offer a deduction___the deduction must always be inducted in___First___No deduction in is possible.

Exact Intuitional Perception Induction Logic

From the earliest times of antiquity the world’s greatest thinkers have puzzled over mastering the exact mechanics and proofs of induction, deduction and intuition. As I mentioned above, Socrates/Plato came the closest, the earliest, in its clearest explication, culminating in “Noesis” and “Perception”. We next pick it up in Eudoxas, Archimedes, Appolonius, then the Arabs Diophantus, Al-Khwarizmi, Biruni and Avicenna, on into the European Continent through Adalard, DeVinci, Vives, Whewell and many, many more, yet it was Scotus and Ockham who achieved anything close to Socrates/Plato’s induction explication of mind, even though there are shortcomings in their early thought, they are still well worth the read. Socrates clearly stated knowledge was perception, thus mind was perception to him, as it is interpreted by myself and many modern epistemologists, but I must explain this deeper for you to see and accept my analysis.

I’ll first state the exact mechanics of perception/mind is the intuitive mechanics of 1st, induction/logic, 2nd, deduction/reason, and 3rd, intuition/abduction, and intuition is the same and similar mechanics as abduction, which Peirce explained through his system of semioses and signs. By substituting these three terms we can be much less complicating in the explanation of said mechanics. Ground state observations are always first state inductions, passive and active choices. Analytics of these inductions is most always, secondly, deductions of the first ground state. Thirdly, all triadic transductions of inductions and deductions is intuitive/abductive. These intuitive processes are both passive background natural state processing and active choice state processing of inductions, deductions, stored memory state inductions, deductions, and visions, metaphors, hypotheses, epiphanies, senses, intellectual memory states, of which all are transducted in and out of perception by passive and active will and intuition. Judgment acts deductively on the above said transactions, yet the over-all mechanics is conducted by our intuitional being, The “I” self of perception, and not as Wittgenstein stated, that we needn’t worry about the “I” self, yet it is the central processor of all inductions, deductions and intuitions, whether passive or active, so far more important than Wittgenstein stated. Exactly, there is no set state space where perception, or any epistemic agent must be housed, as perception agency and all its agents can transduct to all areas of each, yet most of the time all act within the over-arching perception, the head master processor of mind/brain state spaces, and may always be in perception, as my investigations can not penetrate the central mechanics, absolutely positively. This is why it’s always been so hard to describe successfully, whether by abduction, cognition, logic, reason, psychology or whatever, the clearest rendition of total actions. The all self “I” can be everywhere, all at once, within either the mind or brain, and all its agents can also(Peirce’s complex sign semioses), yet we neurologically know perception to be the largest neural network of the brain, wired most everywhere. Basically, as I’ve stated earlier, the agent/tool, reason, asks the questions, and logic answers the questions, yet the complexities of the transc(i)ndence of the repeating transductions between perception agency and its agents can be quite an extended process, to achieve exact thinking results, which we induct back out into the public sphere, or store in our many memory storage state spaces. We do know where perception is physically located, but I do not know the capacities of the isomorphic photonic and other em(electro-magnetic wave/particles) motion state capacities, as to inter-changing locations within mind/perception/brain state spaces. I just know the facts of what happens, generally, within perception, and believe all agents exist in the periphery of the perception neural net, when not in use, as I can always see them when specifically ascribing them to the center of perception. We can only know we do change state spaces of agency and agents, just as Peirce described it with abduction and his semioses of signs. It’s just easier to describe the actions with the agents of logic, reason and intuition perceptionally functioning through the repeating transductions of this central triad.

Now, you may ask how do I know all this? Sixty years of study and personal experience and scientific testing of results, by myself and thousands of other authors, confirms my results. The proofs of inductions has been attested to by authors since Archimedes, with his “center of mass” induction proofs by algebraic and mathematical geometric and calculus results, to modern day inductionists such as Huygens, Euler, Bolzano, Whewell, DeMorgan, Jevons, Peirce, Einstein, Veblen, Brouwer, Keynes, Cajori, Davidson and many, many more, who proved their initial inductions with inductive results. These all used forms of empirical probability math(non-Beyesian insurance probability plus others) and actual empirical evidence to prove their inductions. I also use initial or other discovered or intuited inductions to prove all my inductions, and also accept deductions and intuitionistic math and logic, and some classical math and logic, in the interim stages of intuitive transductions, of the initial inductions and deductions, to solve scientifically for all my ideas. I lean heavily on the scientists and mathematicians of all ages and nations, to achieve satisfactorily exacting answers. As to the above mind mechanics results, it’s all in correspondence with uniting math’s many enjoyable puzzles, of its many isomorphic, morphic and ergodic maths, plus many geometries, algebras and calculi, logics, and over forty+ years of intense inner self-investigation, then uniting that with all life’s experiences, maths, logics and studies of. This is only a general rough summary of my most recent ideas, which I will elaborate on in the coming months, to show a new path into global self-understanding of economics’ realities and solutions…

Intuitional perception is the isomorphic agent between the sense agents, and rational and logical agents. Intuition can be and is both, emotional and logical mind/brain state spaces’ agent. Emotional and folk-wise, it functions fine as “logica utens” and as the scientific intellect, it functions fine as “logica docens.” Both uses are completely, eclectically, compatible. We as a human culture are bound to the necessary contractual responsibility of self, to the natural law of logical, mathematically proven, inductive intuitive liberty, “iff” we wish to survive___This is simply a logical, empirical, inductive and deductive observation…

As I’ve stated before, it all comes down to personal Choice, and I choose to install my fundamental intuitive perceptual “Self-I” in natural “Mother-Wit” and “Common Sense”. It’s simply up to all of us to choose to install the natural “Self-I” in the agent/agency we are most comfortable operating from, but we should all, foremost, realize we do have such a “free-choice”. If we wish, we may operate from our souls, spirits, emotions, compassions, empathy, ego, reason, intellect, logic or any other perceptual agent available to us___It’s entirely a matter of Choice… I only have one suggestion; that everyone install the self-operation of judgment, from one’s better nature, and install the self-operation of one’s intellect, from one’s higher nature, then maybe, we could all get along better…

I hope this makes my analogies of Peirce’s thought clearer. If not, e-mail me at: lloyd.gillespie@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF LAW. - Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Ethics [1796]

The Law Of Liberty...

INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF LAW.
SEC. A.—
WHAT THE SCIENCE OF LAW IS.
THE aggregate of those laws which may be externally promulgated is law (jus). If really so announced by a lawgiver, such legislation becomes real, and composes positive law (jus scriptum). He who knows this, is a jurisconsult; and is even jurisperitus when he can dexterously apply the law to occurring cases,—a skill which, if great, may even entitle a man to rank among the jurisprudents. When, however, we abstract from such jurisperitia and jurisprudentia, what remains is merely the scientific theory of law. By the science of law is meant the systematic knowledge of the principles of the law of nature (from which positive law takes its rise), which is for ever the same, and carries its sure and unchanging obligations over all nations and throughout all ages.

SEC. B.—
WHAT IS LAW?
This is a question which may embarrass the lawyer as much as the celebrated question, “What is truth?” does the logician; for he must avoid tautology, and give a general explanation abstracted from the particular legislation obtaining in any one country. What the law in any instance is (quid sit juris), the jurisconsult can easily tell; but whether it is right or just that it should be so, is what he wants a criterion to determine. But this criterion can only then be found when, abandoning all posteriori principles, he ascends to the sources of reason, and discovers on what all legislation whatsoever can alone be based; in which analysis positive law is doubtless a great help and guide. But laws founded singly on experience, are like the mask in the fable, beautiful, but hollow.

The notion of law, in so far as it imports obligation—i.e., annexes the predicate, “forbidden” or “allowed,” to an action—regards, first, the external practical relation of person to person, in so far as the actions of one may affect or influence another; second, it does not regard the relation betwixt the choice of one and the wishes or wants of another, as in deeds of benevolence or severity, but merely respects the relationship of choice to choice; thirdly, in this reciprocal relationship of choices, no question is made as to the matter chosen. The form of the choice, i.e., the choice considered as free, is alone regarded, i.e., whether the action of one man is consistent with, and does not impair, the free choice of another.

Law—the rule of right—is therefore the aggregate of those conditions, according to which personal choices may harmonize and not destroy one another by being subordinated to freedom’s law universal.

SEC. C.—
SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF LAW.
Every action isright and just,the maxim of which allows the agents freedom of choice to harmonize with the freedom of every other,according to a universal law.

If, therefore, my deportment, or, generally, my condition is not inconsistent with the universal freedom of every other person, he does me a wrong who hinders such state, or obstructs my actions; for such obstruction is inconsistent with a universal law of liberty.

From this it follows, that no one is legally entitled to demand that I make this principle of universal legality the maxim or spring of my conduct. Another’s freedom may be indifferent to me,—nay, I may wish to evade it; but so long as I do it not, I am juridically just. That justice should be itself my maxim, belongs to the second part of Ethics.

The law or universal rule of right is, So act that the use of thy freedom may not circumscribe the freedom of any other (i.e. if thy act or maxim were made imperative on all),—a law imposing no doubt obligation, but which does not exact the determination of choice by the contemplation of the obligation. Reason singly announces, that it in idea so limits freedom, and that others may in real fact and event co-act such limitation; and this it announces as a postulate incapable of further proof. As we here treat not of offices of virtue, but explain what is just and right, it is impossible to represent this law as the spring moving us to action.

SEC. D.—
LAW CARRIES WITH IT A TITLE OF CO-ACTION.
An obstacle opposed to that which hinders an effect, advances that effect, and tends to that end. But everything unjust is a hindrance to freedom, according to law universal. Again, co-action is a hindrance put upon freedom. Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is a hindrance to freedom universal, i.e., unjust and wrong, then co-action preventing such misuse of freedom goes to establish freedom according to a universal law, i.e., is just or right; and consequently law has in itself a right to co-act him who attempts to violate it.

SEC. E. —
LAW MAY LIKEWISE BE STRICTLY DEFINED AS THAT BY WHICH MUTUAL CO-ACTION IS MADE CONSISTENT WITH UNIVERSAL FREEDOM.
The purport of this sentence is, that Law is not to be regarded as made up of two parts, the one obligation, the other a title to co-act; but that the very notion of law consists in that of the possibility of combining universal mutual co-action with every person’s freedom.

For since law respects that only which is external and phenomenal in an action, strict law, i.e., law in which no ethical consideration is introduced, can require no internal, but merely external, determinators of choice, even although co-action be required to do so. All law whatever rests, it is true, on the consciousness of obligation under the moral law itself; but pure or strict law, in the sense now taken, does not expect that this consciousness should be the spring of conduct; but supports itself as a legislation for external actions, on its principle of co-action. When, therefore, it is said a creditor is entitled to demand payment from his debtor, that never implies that he may represent to the latter that his own reason imposes that obligation; but it signifies that external co-action physically forcing the payment of debt consists with universal freedom, and so even with the debtor’s. This position of reciprocal action and co-action throughout the whole system of Intelligents, gives, if I may so speak, a lively image of the notion Law in a sensible figure à priori, and carries us by analogy to the law of action and reaction in the communicating of external motion; and as by virtue of it the quantity of motion remained undiminished, so here, by virtue of this reciprocal co-active mechanism, the quantum of personal freedom is preserved undiminished throughout the system, in the intercourse and exchange of man with man.

Again, as in the Mathematics, the truths of that science are not deduced from the naked notion, but by help of the configurations of space answering to the given notion; so it is not so much the notion Law, as that equal and mutual co-action corresponding to the idea, by means of which a deduction, and, as I may say, delineation of its truths are possible (i.e., the propositions are not taken from the originary moral idea of the law, but from this subjected mechanism). (Beck. Com. 107.) And because to this dynamic notion co-action three corresponds a formal one, taken from the Mathematics previously spoken of, it comes to pass, that what is right is cogitated and spoken of as we do of right lines, where “right,” the rectilineal, are opposed to “curves” and oblique lines. That kind of rightness which is opposed to “curve,” is that inward property of a line, whereby it is the only one possible betwixt two points; and that rightness opposed to obliquity takes place where, betwixt two intersecting segments, one only perpendicular can be drawn, inclining to neither segment, but dividing equally the enclosed space.

In like manner, law insists that there be rigidly and equally given to every man his own; a mathematical precision not exigible in the offices of virtue, these last often admitting a certain latitude of application. However, without wandering into the domain of Ethics, there are two cases demanding solution, but which no Œdipus seems willing to resolve, and look as if they belonged to the “Intermundia” of Epicurus. Such two stumbling blocks1 must forthwith be removed from the domain of jurisprudence proper, lest their uncertainties should be imagined to have any common part with the firm and stable principles of law.

[1 ]Viz., Equity and Necessity.

The Triadic Mind...

New, Feb. 24, High Noon: Geithner v. The American Oligarchs

"All human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the developement of our inborn animal instincts". Charles Sanders Pierce
Pragmatist: "It will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish—one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached—or else is downright absurd; so that all such rubbish being swept away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences—the truth about which can be reached without those interminable misunderstandings and disputes which have made the highest of the positive sciences a mere amusement for idle intellects, a sort of chess—idle pleasure its purpose, and reading out of a book its method. In this regard, pragmaticism is a species of prope-positivism. But what distinguishes it from other species is, first, its retention of a purified philosophy; secondly, its full acceptance of the main body of our instinctive beliefs; and thirdly, its strenuous insistence upon the truth of scholastic realism, (or a close approximation to that, well stated by the late Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot in the Introduction to his Scientific Theism). So, instead of merely jeering at metaphysics, like other prope-positivists, whether by long-drawn-out parodies or otherwise, the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give life and light to cosmology and physics. At the same time, the moral applications of the doctrine are positive and potent; and there are many other uses of it not easily classed. On another occasion, instances may be given to show that it really has these effects". Peirce
"Man knows as far as he can make." Juan Luis Vives

(New Jan 31,) THE METAPHYSICS OF REASON, by Argyris Nicolaidis on Plato, Peirce, Godel and Wittgenstein

"The symptoms of the contemporary neuroscientific discourse show that we are heading towards a new era of scientific encounters, the Peircean era of pure scientific observation beyond disciplinary egocentrism." Deutsche Gesellschaft

A natural scientist by training and the son of the eminent mathematician Benjamin Peirce, he developed the philosophical basis of semeiotic in a series of articles in the late 1860s ("Questions Concerning Certain Capacities Claimed for Man," "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"). There Peirce levelled a devastating critique of Cartesian philosophy and foundationalism, arguing that all cognition is irreducibly triadic, of the nature of a sign, fallible, and thoroughly immersed in a continuing process of interpretation. He considered his semeiotic (as he spelled it, in contrast with current usage of "semiotics" as an inclusive term for all the various studies of signs) as a general theory of logic, and saw language as but a portion of semeiosis.

A Peirce Counterpart: Bakhtin's Triadic Mind
It is here also that Bakhtin introduces an architectonic model of the human psyche which consists of three components: “I-for-myself”, “I-for-the-other”, and “other-for-me”. The I-for-myself is an unreliable source of identity, and Bakhtin argues that it is the I-for-the-other through which human beings develop a sense of identity because it serves as an amalgamation of the way in which others view me. Conversely, other-for-me describes the way in which others incorporate my perceptions of them into their own identities. Identity, as Bakhtin describes it here, does not belong merely to the individual, rather it is shared by all.

Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Art is considered to be Bakhtin’s seminal work, and it is here that Bakhtin introduces three important concepts.

First, is the concept of the unfinalizable self: individual people cannot be finalized, completely understood, known, or labeled. Though it is possible to understand people and to treat them as if they are completely known, Bakhtin’s conception of unfinalizability respects the possibility that a person can change, and that a person is never fully revealed or fully known in the world. Readers may find that this conception reflects the idea of the soul; Bakhtin had strong roots in Christianity and in the Neo-Kantian school led by Hermann Cohen, both of which emphasized the importance of an individual's potentially infinite capability, worth, and the hidden soul.

Second, is the idea of the relationship between the self and others, or other groups. According to Bakhtin, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. In an interview, Bakhtin once explained that,

In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding—in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others.

As such, Bakhtin's philosophy greatly respected the influences of others on the self, not merely in terms of how a person comes to be, but also in how a person thinks and how a person sees him- or herself truthfully.

Third, Bakhtin found in Dostoevsky's work a true representation of polyphony, that is, many voices. Each character in Dostoevsky's work represents a voice that speaks for an individual self, distinct from others. This idea of polyphony is related to the concepts of unfinalizability and self-and-others, since it is the unfinalizability of individuals that creates true polyphony.

Baktin also briefly outlined the polyphonic concept of truth. He criticized the assumption that, if two people disagree, at least one of them must be in error. He challenged philosophers for whom plurality of minds is accidental and superfluous. For Bakhtin, truth is not a statement, a sentence or a phrase. Instead, truth is a number of mutually addressed, albeit contradictory and logically inconsistent, statements. Truth needs a multitude of carrying voices. It cannot be held within a single mind, it also cannot be expressed by “a single mouth.” The polyphonic truth requires many simultaneous voices. Bakhtin does not mean to say that many voices carry partial truths that complement each other. A number of different voices do not make the truth if simply “averaged”, or “synthesized.” It is the fact of mutual addressivity, of engagement, and of commitment to the context of a real-life event, that distinguishes truth from untruth.

When, in subsequent years, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Art was translated into English and published in the West, Bakhtin added a chapter on the concept of carnival and the book was published with the slightly different title, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics. According to Bakhtin, carnival is the context in which distinct individual voices are heard, flourish and interact together. The carnival creates the "threshold" situations where regular conventions are broken or reversed and genuine dialogue becomes possible. The notion of a carnival was Bakhtin's way of describing Dostoevsky's polyphonic style: each individual character is strongly defined, and at the same time the reader witnesses the critical influence of each character upon the other. That is to say, the voices of others are heard by each individual, and each inescapably shapes the character of the other.

I just had to add this clear explanation of Charles Sanders Peirce's thinking:

Abduction as an aspect of retroduction, Phyllis Chiasson
Charles Sanders Peirce's Influence: Juan Luis Vives

One of the most intriguing mysteries in American philosophy falls under the question: "Just what does Charles Sanders Peirce¹s concept of abductive reasoning comprise?" Peirce used the terms "abduction" and "retroduction" interchangeably as names for a distinct form of logical inference, as well as for the method by which hypotheses are engendered. He considered his theory of abduction essential to (and even overarching of) his theory of pragmatism[1]. Yet nearly a century after his death, Peirce's concept of abduction is still poorly understood. This entry will explore the two distinct meanings of the intertwined concepts that Peirce variously called "abduction" and "retroduction." One meaning refers to a distinct form of logical inference; the other, to the form of a deliberate and overarching logical method which incorporates abduction, deduction, and induction for its full performance. If modern researchers were to accept this proposed separation of Peirce¹s terminology (abduction and retroduction) to identify these different levels of concepts within his notion of abduction, we could finally begin the task of developing effective operational definitions for abduction and retroduction. These definitions would take us a long way toward solving the "mystery" about what Peirce meant by his concept of abduction and toward making "right reasoning" a teachable skill.
Key words: abduction, retroduction, methodeutic, aesthetics, musement, psychological

THE PROBLEM
Peirce used the terms: abduction and retroduction interchangeably for two concepts–one overarching the other. He conceived abduction/retroduction as one of three distinct forms of logical inference. Yet, at the same time, he described abduction/retroduction as comprising one entire branch of logic. Thus in practical terms, the abduction/retroduction dilemma has two parts each of which stem from several dichotomous descriptions. Four of these apparently dichotomous descriptions follow:

In one sense, Peirce tells us that an abductive inference is a response to an anomalous fact that results in a guess (or explanatory hunch) about the probable cause of that fact[2].
Elsewhere, Peirce describes abduction as the aesthetic process of musement, which must follow no rules except "the very law of liberty[3]."
Another sense of the term abduction (which fits Peirce’s contention that abduction belongs within the category of normative science), seems to entirely contradict the first two senses. For Peirce tells us that an abductive inference cannot be in any way psychological, and is "deduced mathematically from the categories [4]."
In a fourth apparent contradiction, Peirce tells us that methodeutic, the third category of logic (and which is the logic of scientific method), is "nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone [5]."
Adding to the confusion is Peirce’s identification of logic as one of three branches of normative science (aesthetics and ethics are the other two), meaning that the category of logic provides the norms (standards, rules, methods) by which each of the methods of reasoning are to be performed[6]. In addition, Peirce insists that reasoning is a form of deliberate conduct, and is therefore subject to praise and blame–making logic a form of ethical behavior and thus subject to the rules of right conduct[7]. In addition, Peirce placed ethics into a subordinate relationship to aesthetics (the science of the ideal), saying that ethics must be informed by aesthetics[8].

Part one of the abduction dilemma involves reconciling the first three senses of abduction:

How can noticing a "surprising" fact and the making of a "guess" be subject to norms (that is: have rules and standards)? Can there be a "norm" for what is "surprising" or not?
"How can an aesthetic process undergone by musing–which requires obeying only the "very law of liberty" yet still operate within a logical norm? And how can one obey only the "very law of liberty," yet be circumscribed by ethical norms (as Peirce claimed logic must be)?
How can either of the first two senses of abduction be reconciled with Peirce’s contention that abduction cannot be in anyway psychological? Aren’t "surprises," "guesses," and "musing" dependent upon psychological processes?
Part two of the abduction dilemma brings up only one question here, but that question provides the strongest basis for separating the concepts of "abduction" and "retroduction." This second part of the abduction dilemma arises from Peirce’s statement that methodeutic (which is "nothing but heuretic") "concerns abduction alone."

How can the logic of scientific method "concern abduction alone," if abduction is only one of three forms of logical inference? Aren’t the other two forms of logical inference (deduction and induction) required for the proper performance of scientific method?
Because the two parts of the abduction/retroduction dilemma are so intertwined, we will not be dealing with them separately as "part one" and "part two." Instead, we will examine together clues and contradictions which point up these two parts of the dilemma, and which will lead us to the basis for rescuing the terms "abduction" and "retroduction" from their mistaken synonymy and place them into service appropriately.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
Despite the risk of temporarily violating Peirce’s "terminological ethics," let us begin by examining the terminological basis for identifying abduction and retroduction by distinct meanings. This "terminological" violation is only temporary, since Peirce, by selecting the terms "abduction" and "retroduction," provided us with a terminological justification for applying these terms to distinguish between two levels of concepts. Since he was so precise in his use of definitive language, the rationale for separating the meanings in this way should begin with an examination of the root meanings of the words "retroduction," "abduction" (and, while we are at it, for "deduction," and "induction" as well).

Retroduction:
The prefix "retro," occurs in loanwords from Latin having to do with going backward. Yet, the prefix "retro" provides an implication of deliberateness–of deliberately "choosing" to go backward for a purpose. Thus "retroactive" means choosing to go back to an earlier date and make something operative as of that date. "Retrofit" means choosing to go back and modify an earlier model of something with an improvement of some sort. The combination of the prefix "retro" (as deliberately "going backward") with the suffix "ductive" from the Latin ducere (to lead) places the meaning of retroduction as "deliberately leading backward." This implies that retroduction is intended to be a deliberate and recursive process involving more than the making of an abductive inference. Its Latin roots indicate that "retroduction" refers, not only to the apprehension of a "surprising fact," and an ensuing hunch, but also that the hunch, once formed, is deliberately and recursively taken "backward" for analysis and adjustment (requiring deduction and induction), before it is engendered into a hypothesis worthy of extensive testing.

Abduction:
The prefix "ab" appears in loanwords from Latin where it meant "away from." Thus we have words like "abdicate" and "abolition"–going "away from" the throne and from slavery, respectively. Thus, when the prefix "ab" (away from) is combined with the suffix "ductive" (from the Latin ducere, meaning to lead) we have the meaning of abduction as "leading away from." The term "abduction" fits well with the concept of abduction as moving "away from" a particular course or topic, as one would when responding to an anomaly, or a "surprising fact." The Latin root for "abduction" does not fit with the idea of going backward to explicate and evaluate an idea. Rather, this root indicates that the outward movement of an abductive inference allows the result of such an inference to be left as a completion, or used as the sole means for further exploration of possibilities–as in the arts.

Deduction:
The prefix "de" from Latin loanwords refers to separation, removal, and negation. When we combine the prefix "de" (to separate) with the suffix "ductive" (to lead), we have the meaning of deduction as "leading to separation, removal, or negation," which are the goals and consequences of deductive reasoning.

Induction:
The prefix "in," also from the Latin has to do with inclusion. Thus, the prefix "in" (to include) combined with the suffix "ductive" means "leading into" (or including), as one would do when reaching a conclusion by estimating from a sample, or generalizing from a number of instances.

Therefore, based upon their Latin derivations (to which Peirce was partial, as he was for Greek roots) our four terms have the following meanings:

Retroduction = deliberately leading backward.
Abduction = leading away from
Deduction = leading to separation, removal, or negation.
Induction = "leading into" (or including) .
ABDUCTION AND RETRODUCTION ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE TERMS
A big question (one which this writer cannot answer) is why would Peirce, who was otherwise meticulous in his use of terminology, apply the terms "retroduction" (which according to its Latin roots should mean deliberately "leading backward") and "abduction" (which should mean "leading away from") interchangeably? It could be that the answer to this question resides in some of Peirce’s later writings and existential graphs, which are not yet generally available. In any case, there are some signs that, toward the end of his life, he had begun thinking of the two concepts as intertwined, but distinct.

In 1911, just three years before his death, Peirce wrote:

"I am just now trying to get a small book written in which I positively prove just what the justification of each of the three types of reasoning consists in…and showing the real nature of Retroduction[9].

Since Peirce never completed this "small book," we cannot be entirely certain of what he exactly meant by the third of these "types of reasoning" (the other two are deduction and induction), or by his comment about "the real nature of Retroduction." However, although he never completed the book proposed in 1911, Peirce did publish an essay in 1908 that seems to have heuristically fulfilled that goal. This essay provides strong support for a different set of meanings for the terms "abduction" and "retroduction" (although there he applied the term "retroduction" for both meanings). In "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,[10]" Peirce describes a process (musement[11]) that neatly corresponds to the process of abduction as "leading away from" a point of interest into "a petite bouchée with the Universes" of experience. There, he provides a detailed description of how the abductive process (as musement) engages within and among the three categories[12]. Then Peirce tells us that:

Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or another of the three Universes[13], as some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation…. The whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at its mercy, the search for pertinent circumstances and the laying hold of them, the dark laboring, the bursting out of startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility, I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry.[14]

The "First Stage" of inquiry that Peirce is referring to above is the stage of hypothesis construction. The "Second Stage" of inquiry is explication and demonstration of the hypothesis (by means of deduction) and the "Third Stage" is comprised of classification, testing, and evaluation. However, in actual practice, the reasoning forms of deduction and induction are not just applied during their specific stages. The chasm Peirce describes above between the noticing of an anomaly and the "acceptance of the hypothesis" cannot be bridged by the making of abductive inferences alone, but rather by the recursive interplay of abduction, deduction, and induction. For, Peirce said that "the whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis…compos[es] the First Stage of Inquiry." He did not say that merely the "noticing of an anomaly" and "the getting of a hunch" composes the First Stage of inquiry. For, within the full process of "engendering a hypothesis (which is a retroductive process)," resides the subordinate process of noticing an anomaly and getting an explanatory hunch (by means of abduction). Thus, for the "first stage" of reasoning to occur by means of retroduction, abduction must operate in recursive interplay with the other reasoning forms (deduction and induction) to engender a hypothesis worthy of acceptance and scientific inquiry.

"Retroduction," Peirce then states, "does not afford security. The proposition must be tested.[15]" He follows his description of musement with explanations of the processes and purposes of deduction and induction as well. After making this thorough description of the roles and processes of abduction as musement (as well as of deduction and induction), Peirce paradoxically claims that these three inferencing methods interact to engender a hypothesis (in this case, for "the Reality of God"[16]). He specifically asserts that "the N. A. [Neglected Argument] is the First Stage of scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest plausibility…." His "Neglected Argument," then, is comprised of the deliberate and recursive use of abduction, deduction, and induction, for engendering "…a hypothesis of the very highest plausibility [the hypothesis of the reality of God] whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of a man’s conduct of life[17]." Peirce’s Neglected Argument lends credibility to the proposition that one meaning of abduction (the one here referred to as "retroduction") includes the processes of deduction and induction, as well as abduction, for its performance. Peirce’s claim for the requirement of the deliberate control of abduction, deduction, and induction (as described in "Neglected Argument") for ultimately engendering the "hypothesis of God," corresponds to the deliberate process of pre-and post reflection and analysis–the "backward leading" recursive analysis, which we are here defining as "retroduction."

His description of the process of musement in "Neglected Argument," and the implication that this process is abductive (not retroductive) brings up again the questions of the first part of our abduction dilemma:

How can noticing a "surprising" fact and the making of a "guess" be subject to norms (that is: have rules and standards)? Can there be a "norm" for what is "surprising" or not?
"How can an aesthetic process undergone by musing–which requires obeying only the "very law of liberty" yet still operate within a logical norm? And how can one obey only the "very law of liberty," yet also be circumscribed by ethical norms (as Peirce claimed logic must be)?
How can either of the first two senses of abduction be reconciled with Peirce’s contention that abduction cannot be in anyway psychological? Aren’t "surprises," "guesses," and "musing" dependent upon psychological processes?
Perhaps the first two questions above can be answered together. For a "surprising fact" to be noticed and for a subsequent "guess" as to its cause to be made according to normative principles (without any reference to psychology), there must be a normative category which (though seeming psychological) is dependent upon mathematics, as are all of the normative sciences. Since the category of aesthetics fits that description, we can explore the apparent paradox of norming the apprehension of a "surprise" and the making of "guesses" by addressing the aesthetic process which Peirce called "musing." Peirce borrowed the term "musement" from Friedrich Von Schiller’s 1794 book Letters Upon The Aesthetic Education of a Young Man.[18] Peirce studied Schiller intently in his early twenties, then put aside this work for many years[19]. Yet, one cannot help wonder at Schiller’s influence upon the emergence of Peirce’s concept of abduction. For late in life, Peirce returned to Schiller’s aesthetic concept of musement as a heuristic device for explaining the way in which new possibilities are discovered and explored–the same process which he elsewhere refers to variously as abduction and retroduction. Many scholars have addressed this apparent relation of abduction to aesthetics[20], even in the face of Peirce’s insistence that abduction is a distinct logical form subject to the strictures of ethical norms.

In "Neglected Argument," Peirce emphasizes that "musement" (the state from which an abductive inference is generated) must be an entirely unfettered process–following only the laws of "Pure Play." "Now Play, as we all know," wrote Peirce, "is a lively exercise of one’s powers. Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation…"[21] Peirce even ventures so far as to insist that pessimists cannot properly perform abductive reasoning, since pessimism closes off entire categories of possibilities and is thus a hindrance to obeying the "law of liberty." [22]

On the other hand, Peirce insisted that logic is not only a normative science (as are aesthetics and ethics), it is also a "mirror of ethics" (the science of conduct) and, thus, subject to standards by which one should properly conduct rational thought. In his 1905 essay "What Pragmatism Is," Peirce wrote:

Now, thinking is a species of conduct which is largely subject to self-control. In all their features (which there is no room to describe here), logical self-control is a perfect mirror of ethical self-control–unless it be a species under that genus.[23]

Let us take a closer look now at the apparent contradiction between Peirce’s notion of abduction as deriving from the unfettered activity of Pure Play and his insistence that logic is a species of conduct.

"Logical self-control is a perfect mirror of ethical self-control…."
"Pure Play [from which abductive inferences may result] has no rules, except the very law of liberty."
Therein lies the dilemma. Peirce claims abduction as the crown jewel of logic. He insists that logic is a normative science, dependent upon ethics–meaning that it must follow certain standards of right conduct for its proper performance. Yet, how can abduction be subject to self-control (as are ethics and logic according to Peirce) if its performance must have no rules, "except the very law of liberty?" Can there be self-control without norms (or rules) from which to deliberately control oneself–from which to make deliberate choices? If abductive inferences result from the entirely unfettered process of "Pure Play," and if "logical self-control is a perfect mirror of ethical self-control," how can abductive inferences be made while logic is "fettered" by the standards (rules or norms) of "ethical self-control?"

By turning to Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences, we can begin to get a view of Peirce’s "big picture" concerning all of theoretical science and its sub-branch, the "science of discovery," within which logic dwells. Perhaps from this larger view, we can see how his concepts of abduction/retroduction should fit in. Peirce tells us that each division in his classification of the sciences depends upon the one which precedes it[24].

The "first" science of discovery, according to Peirce, is mathematics–which studies "what is and is not logically possible, without making itself responsible for its actual existence[25]." Philosophy (which is the second branch of the science of discovery and, thus, dependent upon mathematics [26]) is comprised of three branches: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics. Phenomenology studies the sorts of "elements universally present" in phenomena (meaning the elements universally present in whatever is present in the mind at anytime in anyway). Peirce writes that:

Normative science "distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be…. Metaphysics "seeks to give an account of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science[27]."

Peirce’s division of normative science is comprised of aesthetics, ethics, and logic (in that order), with ethics dependent upon aesthetics for its ideals, and logic dependent upon ethics for its principles of conduct. Logic, in turn, consists of three categories: speculative grammar (which is the general theory of the nature of signs and their meanings), critic (which is usually considered as "formal logic"), and methodeutic (the logic of scientific method). As with each of his classifications, a particular division is always dependent upon all of those which precede it. Peirce further claimed that there is no room for the psychological in critical logic:

[N]o…psychological doctrine can be admitted into critical logic. The true doctrine is deduced mathematically from the categories. The justification of abduction follows from it; and from this in turn follow the rules of abduction. [28]

So, with the above in mind, where does the concept of abduction as musement fit in? Remember, musement is a sort of speculation that arises during Pure Play–the activity that "has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation…." Can we have a norm for a form of logic which depends upon mathematics and ethics, but "has no rules, except this very law of liberty?" Or, is the abduction of musement of another sort than the abduction of critical logic? In his memoir of methodeutic, Peirce wrote:

I here consider precisely what methodeutic is. I show that it is here permissible to resort to certain methods not admissible in [speculative grammar] or in critic. Primarily, methodeutic is nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone…[29]

So, we now are back to the two parts of our abduction/retroduction dilemma, for we have two claims for abduction:

first, that it is not psychological because "no such doctrine can be admitted into critical logic," and
second, that methodeutic logic (which is the logic of scientific method) is nothing but heuretic; that it concerns abduction alone; and that this form of logic may resort "to certain methods not admissible in" speculative grammar or critical logic. [30]
Thus in one sense, Peirce’s notion of abduction is the aesthetic activity of musement. In another sense, abduction is a type of inference which is mathematically deduced from the categories and cannot be psychological. And, in yet another sense, abduction is a method of reasoning that comprises the entirety of the branch of logic (methodeuic), which is "nothing but heuretic." Peirce’s use of the term "heuretic" here is a noun form which means the art of discovery or invention [31]." The more familiar form of this word is the adjective, "heuristic." A heuristic device is a tool (often an analytical tool in the form of a diagram, model, analogy, or metaphor) which helps to show how the qualities and relations of qualities are to be sought for a particular purpose. Thus if methodeutic logic is "nothing but" the art of discovery or invention, then it is likely comprised of the qualities, and patterns of relations among qualities, by which this "art of discovery" should be undergone.

So, let us take up the latter assertion first. By saying that methodeutic logic is nothing but heuretic, Peirce is saying that his methodeutic is nothing but a device for demonstrating how the qualities and relations of qualities of (or by) "abduction alone" are to be sought in "the art of discovery or invention." He also tells us that methodeutic logic may resort "to certain methods not admissible in" critical logic. From this we might infer that "psychological factors" (such as "surprise," "value," and other modes dependent upon sense or affect) might be employable as heuristic devices for explaining abduction, while not actually belonging to abduction, to mathematics, or to any of the sciences of discovery. We might also suspect that the deliberate form of recursive analysis (the interplay of abduction, deduction, and induction), which we are referring to as "retroduction," might provide the qualities and relations of qualities by which the individual processes within it (abduction, deduction, and induction) can be tested. Additionally, we might also reasonably suspect that, when taken as a whole, Peirce’s methodeutic, which is ("nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone") might provide the method by which the recursive analytical process of "retroduction" can itself be tested.

If any or all of the above is so, it would not mean that the logic of methodeutic (or of abduction as musing, guessing, or responding to surprise) cannot be represented mathematically. It would only mean that, in addition to mathematical representations, other means "not admissible in critical logic" are available to this branch of logic for representing qualities and the relations of qualities of the normative sciences–including aesthetics, ethics, and logic. For, such psychological attitudes as "musement," "guessing," or "surprise," would be heuristic devices for representing the qualities of abduction. And, in the same way, certain "practical" applications of Peirce’s methodeutic (or of any of the components of that method) could also be considered as heuristic devices representing the qualities and relations of qualities of retroduction.

Abduction, then, would not actually BE musement, or BE the reaction to a surprising fact and an ensuing hunch. Rather, abduction would be "the qualities and relations among qualities" of abduction which can be ascertained to some degree by extracting these from heuristic representations of these qualities. Such representations could provide forms and models from which to construct and test hypotheses concerning both abduction as musement and retroduction as methodeutic. For methodeutic, as the logic of scientific method, norms the logical methods which the construction and testing of hypotheses should occur. For Peirce, "‘testing" (not mathematics) provides the sole logical proof of any question concerning Real objects[32,33]." Thus, the "less strict" rules of methodeutic logic allows us to develop a variety of ways to demonstrate and evaluate the development, explication, and testing of hypotheses–(including any hypothesis about the method for developing hypotheses). Peirce wrote:

[S]ince the whole business of heuretic, so far as its theory goes, falls under methodeutic, there is no kind of argumentation that methodeutic can pass over without notice. Nor is methodeutic confined to the consideration of arguments. On the contrary, its special subjects have always been understood to be the definition and division of terms. The formation of systems of propositions, although it has been neglected, should also evidently be included in methodeutic. In its method, methodeutic is less strict than critic. [34]

For methodeutic to "concern abduction alone" and still be the logic of scientific reasoning, the term "abduction" (when Peirce says that "methodeutic concerns abduction alone") should really be termed "retroduction." Since it is the logic of scientific method, methodeutic logic cannot possibly refer only to the noticing of an anomaly and the forming of a hunch. Thus, methodeutic concerned with "abduction alone" really means that it is concerned with "retroduction alone"–for Peirce’s methodeutic is the form of deliberate, recursive analysis which involves the interplay of abduction, deduction, and induction for the development, explication, and (at the least) preliminary testing of hypotheses. As such, "retroduction" as methodeutic is Peirce’s method of "right reasoning." Right reasoning, according to Peirce, can only occur by individuals adhering to the norms of logic that is informed by ethics and guided by the "science of the ideal" when engaged in scientific inquiry.

Now, let us examine Peirce’s suggestion that abduction is the aesthetic activity of musing as this contrasts with to his assertions that:

abduction is a type of inference mathematically deduced from the categories,
abduction is (like all of logic) subject to the norms of ethics, and
abduction is entirely non-psychological.
That, for Peirce, the normative sciences of aesthetics, ethics, and logic are interdependent (as are each of the three types of logical reasoning) is an important concept to keep in mind when considering the "notion of abduction." Such interdependence is an especially important concept when reconciling abduction as musement with the recursive analytical method of retroduction. For, as you will see, the key to the "normative" nature of Peirce’s notion of abduction resides in the category of aesthetics.

Although normative, Peirce placed aesthetics in the position of firstness, overarching (informing) both ethics and logic. Thus, the category of aesthetics as a "normative" science is (like abduction as musing) not subject to ethical norms, but rather to the norming of norms–the exploration and discovery of that which is the "ideal" (and which should therefore, as the ideal, inform both ethics and logic). For Peirce, the "the morally [ethically] good appears as a particular species of the esthetically good [35]," and logic is a "species under the genus[36]" of ethical conduct. He wrote:

I regard Logic as the Ethics of the Intellect–that is, in the sense in which Ethics is the science of the method of bringing Self-control to bear to gain our Satisfactions…. As to what one ought to desire, it is…what he will desire if he sufficiently considers it, and that will be able to make his life beautiful, admirable. Now the science of the Admirable is true Esthetics. Thus, the Freedom of the Will, such as it is, is a one-sided affair, it is freedom to become Beautiful…. There is no Freedom to be or do anything else. Nor is there any freedom to do right if one has neglected the proper discipline….[37]

For Peirce, aesthetic denotes a qualitative state–within which one has the "freedom of the will" (as a one-sided affair) only to strive for the ideal (that which will make one’s life beautiful and admirable). The aesthetic is a state of potentiality from which we respond to and select among qualities and values, based upon the relations among the qualities themselves for achieving the aesthetic ideal--rather than upon their value in the production of outcomes[38]. Thus the aesthetic provides the "norm" (as the "admirable" ideal) for other norms and, as such, is the only "norm" that can be obeyed at the same time as obeying the "very law of liberty" (or "freedom of the will"). From its position of "firstness," the category of aesthetics (science of the ideal) provides the normative force (as feeling, energy, value, purpose, being) from which the very "law of liberty" should be obeyed–such is its "norm." And, since abduction is the method by which qualities as potentialities are noticed, related, and formed into meaningful relationships, abduction must at least begin with the aesthetic norm–for it is the method by which the aesthetic ideal is expressed. In other words, abductive reasoning (as a properly performed form of logic) must at some point have an intimate relationship with the aesthetic. [39]

Of course, even if we accept this aesthetic-abduction connection, the second aspect to the abduction/retroduction dilemma, which we discussed earlier, arises from Peirce’s statement that methodeutic (which is "nothing but heuretic") "concerns abduction alone." The category of methodeutic is supposed to provide the norms for scientific investigation–norms which must include the norms for other forms of inference (deduction and induction) as well as for abduction. Indeed, after laying out his "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (an argument which includes explanations of the roles of deduction and induction as well as "musement" as abduction), Peirce declares that this argument comprises the "First Stage of scientific inquiry." Thus (according to Neglected Argument at least), it is not abduction as musement, but rather the recursive interplay among abduction, deduction, and induction that comprises the "first stage of a scientific inquiry," which is, of course, the development of a hypothesis. Therefore, all three inferencing methods interact during the engendering of a hypothesis–not abduction alone. So, when Peirce tells us that the normative logic of methodeutic is "concerned with abduction alone," it is likely that the concept he means is the recursive analytical process that we have been referring to as "retroduction." And when he tells us that abduction is a logical method for responding to a "surprising fact," for developing a "hunch," and for "musing" he is referring to the aesthetic norm for seeking the beautiful and the admirable (which, for Peirce, was the ultimate aim and end of Truth).

WHY THE TWO CONCEPTS SHOULD BE SEPARATED
We now have the complete core of our two-pronged dilemma: "How can abduction be a form of inference distinct from deduction and induction (as the "unfettered play of musement," or a response to a "surprising fact") and also be a form of recursive analysis that includes deduction and induction as well as abduction?" This manner of referring to the concept of "musement" as abduction, and of "recursive analysis" as retroduction, can eliminate much of the confusion surrounding the notion of abduction–especially as it applies to the logic of Peirce’s methodeutic–which, you will remember, "is nothing but heuretic and concerns abduction alone….[40]"

Also, by taking advantage of the broader range of subjects and tools available to the unique analytical method of Peirce’s methodeutic it is possible to begin building a clearer understanding of what abduction as a mathematical concept (and as an aesthetic method, also dependent upon mathematical description) might be. By distinguishing between these two concepts within Peirce’s methodeutic (defining one as abduction and the other as retroduction), it becomes possible to observe and identify patterns of actions during the actual performance of each of the distinct inferencing processes (abduction, deduction, and induction). These patterns become especially clear as each one plays out in actually–as in the performance of an open-ended task. Because the looser "rules" of the methodeutic branch of logic allow for a variety of ways to demonstrate these specific and overarching reasoning methods, it is possible to use methodeutic logic to construct models for testing the patterns of action that make up each of the three types of inferences. [41]

Another good reason for separating these two concepts (abduction from retroduction) is that retroduction cannot be considered without also considering the relational patterns of (and among) all three types as inferences–as well as the relational aspects of the context for which it is being applied. The broader concept of "retroduction" as methodeutic renders it much more difficult to define in terms of its qualities and their relations, since there are so many more components to consider. However, until an operational definition of abduction (as the pattern of actions distinct from deduction and induction) is available, we cannot hope to develop an operational definition for retroduction. The pattern of actions of abductive reasoning must be known and well-tested before we can effectively identify the qualities and relations among qualities of the overarching pattern of retroductive reasoning. In other words, we must know how to "abduce" before we can possibly hope to learn how to "retroduce."

HOW IT WOULD WORK
We have discussed the possibility that Peirce's concept of abduction (at least as it refers to methodeutic) has at least two meanings–one overarching the other. The overarching meaning of abduction (which I have proposed that we call "retroduction") would cover Peirce's methodeutic and his whole of the concept of continuity as "an affair of thought[42]." As such, the term "retroduction" would include:

bringing a new idea (or hypothesis) up from the region where "all things swim" in the continuum by means of abduction (beginning with an aesthetic inference, which by following the "form" of abduction in Peirce’s critic, becomes a logical inference);
using deduction to explicate and demonstrate aspects of that idea,
using induction to evaluate and secure that idea (however temporarily).
Then, the reasoner returns to abduction and repeats that cycle as necessary. In this sense, the term "retroduction" would be reserved as a definition for the entire abductive–deductive–inductive cycle of Peirce’s methodeutic, saving the term "abduction" to mean a distinct type of inference that is separate and distinct from either deduction or induction.

If we were to define our terms in this way, the term "retroduction" would denote the following recursive cycle that goes into the building up of knowledge:

1. A surprising fact is noticed.
2. An aesthetic (unfettered) exploration of qualities and relationships is made.
3. Abductive reasoning is applied to make a guess that could explain the surprising fact.
4. Deductive reasoning is applied to explicate the guess and ready it for testing.
5. Once readied, inductive reasoning is applied to test and evaluate the guess.
6. Abduction or deduction is used to interpret that evaluation (or new information is produced) and the cycle begins again until a hypothesis (or "conditional purpose") has been fully engendered and is ready for formal explication and testing.

From the above perspective, then, abduction (as opposed to retroduction) is an aesthetically dependent method of logic for addressing surprising (or anomalous) facts and exploring the qualities of these. Once a surprising fact is formed into a hunch, deduction and induction interact recursively with abduction to engender a hypothesis. Once a hypothesis is formed, deduction is the method by which that idea is explicated and readied for testing. Induction is the reasoning method by which the idea is tested, evaluated, and eventually secured. So, within the activity of hypothesis construction, both deduction and induction are needed at times. Thus, the word "retroduction" can stand as an inclusive term (overarching the three inference methods of abduction, deduction, and induction) for Peirce’s methodeutic, defining roles of all three of the processes recursively applied for the discovery and construction of worthy hypotheses (conditional purposes).

BENEFITS
One significant benefit that is likely to result from distinguishing between abduction and retroduction as proposed here will be an enhancement in the clarity of communication among researchers. Since even Peirce was not always talking about the same thing every time he wrote about abduction/retroduction, it is easy to understand why scholars might confuse one another when discussing abduction as well. Another significant benefit would be to enable an operational definition of abductive reasoning–one which can be delineated in critical logic with the same clarity as deduction. A side benefit of being able to define abductive reasoning in this way will be the ability to clear up the confusion between abduction and induction, allowing us to clearly delineate inductive reasoning as well.

Without an operational definition of abductive reasoning, we will never be able to develop an operational definition of retroduction (since abduction is necessary for performing a retroduction, as are deduction and induction). Constructing an operational definition of retroduction will be much more complex than constructing one for abduction. However, without a clear understanding of the abductive reasoning process of abduction and all that it entails, we will not be able to attempt an adequate operational definition of retroduction.

The greatest potential benefits from having such definitions lie in the field of education. Once we remove abduction and retroduction from the realm of vagueness and can clearly delineate these processes and their applications for all to see, we can begin to develop effective ways of teaching others how to effectively apply these reasoning processes to all sorts of situations. The greatest yet unrealized benefit of Peirce’s work to humankind lies in its potential for improving the ability of those at all levels of intellect and in all walks of life to reason more effectively. Before Peirce’s methods of right reasoning can be taught, however, abductive reasoning must have an effective operational definition–one that can be demonstrated and generally understood, so that all of the reasoning methods can be effectively taught and, more importantly, mastered.

CONCLUSION
None of us can develop the capacity to reason more effectively unless the method for reasoning abductively (the method for forming and evaluating worthy purposes) can be taught. Yet, the method of abduction cannot be taught until it is identified and defined in an operational sense. It cannot be defined operationally until we clarify some of the confusing contradictions about abductive reasoning with which Peirce left us.

Therefore, the proposal that we should use the term "abduction" for the reasoning method by which conditional purposes (hypotheses) are constructed and "retroduction" as the overarching method by which theories are engendered (by the interplay of abduction, deduction, and induction) should not be taken lightly. By clearly defining the process of abduction and placing it (along with deduction and induction) under the overarching method of "retroductive" reasoning, we are creating the possibility that all of these reasoning methods can be taught, learned, and, hopefully, mastered. Then, once these processes are mastered, individuals can learn to effectively perform and apply each of these methods appropriately for the construction, explication, and evaluation of all sorts of conditional purposes (including hypotheses)–thus mastering the skills of Peirce’s concept of "right reasoning."

A warning from Paul Krugman of what should be blindingly obvious (but is not obvious to many experts)

Fabius Maximus | Jan 8, 2009
`
Pluto asks here: “what does Fabius think of Paul Krugman’s article in the NYT?”

Here is the article he mentions: “Fighting Off Depression“, Paul Krugman, op-ed in the New York Times, 4 January 2009 — Excerpt:

“If we don’t act swiftly and boldly,” declared President-elect Barack Obama in his latest weekly address, “we could see a much deeper economic downturn that could lead to double-digit unemployment.” If you ask me, he was understating the case.

The fact is that recent economic numbers have been terrifying, not just in the United States but around the world. Manufacturing, in particular, is plunging everywhere. Banks aren’t lending; businesses and consumers aren’t spending. Let’s not mince words: This looks an awful lot like the beginning of a second Great Depression.

… Here’s my nightmare scenario: It takes Congress months to pass a stimulus plan, and the legislation that actually emerges is too cautious. As a result, the economy plunges for most of 2009, and when the plan finally starts to kick in, it’s only enough to slow the descent, not stop it. Meanwhile, deflation is setting in, while businesses and consumers start to base their spending plans on the expectation of a permanently depressed economy - well, you can see where this is going.

It’s not a bad article, as a statement of the by-now blindingly obvious (about which Krugman has repeatedly warned). Readers of this site knew this several months ago. Here are excerpts from posts on the FM site, which new readers might find of interest.

The US economy at Defcon 2, 11 March 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

As a result of #1 (deleveraging}, our financial fabric is ripping. Weak links have been breaking one by one over the past year or so. As each link breaks, there is more stress on the remaining links. The tear is getting longer and wider due to several positive feedback loops. In general, everybody’s (households’, businesses’, investors’ and creditors’) tolerance for risk decreases, and the inevitable reactions slow the economy.

… Massive government intervention must occur soon, or the eventual cost of mitigation will rise several fold. The current tools of fiscal and monetary stimulus plus mild intervention (the “super SIV’ and “Hope Now” plans) are grossly inadequate to the scale of the problem. But this downturn may be evolution in action, the consequences of our past actions. If so, what damage will the government do attempting to prevent the inevitable?

A solution to our financial crisis, 25 September 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

The policy response of our leaders has been inadequate, up to and including the Paulson Plan. Their actions have been incremental and reactive in nature. While each step has been larger than its predecessor, all have been reactions to the past dimension of the crisis — not the future. That is, our leaders have been “behind the curve.”

Paulson and Bernanke have taken actions that would have been effective if applied 2 or 3 quarters earlier. Borrowing a metaphor from emergency medicine, they have squandered the “golden hour“, since the crisis started with the collapse of the mortgage brokers in December 2006.

Correcting this flawed procedure is the first step. Doing so at this late date will require immediate and drastic actions. The severe effects of the recession — now affecting the developed nations, perhaps soon the entire world — will soon be felt, further destabilizing the economy and the financial system.

Recommendations (click links for more information about each)

Stabilize the financial system. (first aid)
Stabilize the economy. (emergency medicine)
Arrange long-term financing for steps #1 and #2 with our foreign creditors. (finance the treatment)
The last opportunity for effective action before disaster strikes, 3 October 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

The end of the post-WWII debt supercycle started with the collapse of the mortgage brokers in December 2006. Since then the government has made aprox 15 initiatives to stop the deterioration of our financial system. The super SIV, 3.25% in cuts to the federal funds rate, FHA Secure, Hope Now, a $120 billion tax rebate, massive expansion of access to the Fed’s discount “window”, TAF auction, TSLF, PDCF, the Bear Stearns bailout, the nationalization of the GSE’s and AIG … and now the TARP (aka the Paulson Plan). Don’t bother looking up the acronyms, they will all soon be forgotten.

All too small, too late. Incremental and reactive, responding to critical problems of last month — irrelevant to the current situation. This is a recipe for disaster. Like in the US 1929-1933 and Japan 1989-1996 — delaying the necessary large-scale response until the problem was no longer manageable.

Now the US financial system is seizing up. The machinery remains, but the gears no longer turn. Most of you have no idea to what I am referring, but you will learn over the next few weeks. To use a bad medical analogy, the financial system has had a cardiac arrest.

The new President will need new solutions for the economic crisis, 9 October 2008:

However, we must prepare for the possibility that the economy will be in a severe recession — or even depression — when the new President takes office in January. A depression does not mean like the 1930’s — the Great Depression. There is a large gap — usually ignored by analysts — between the severe post-WWII recessions (1973-75 and 1980-82) and the horror of the 1930’s. The frequent depressions of the late 1800’s lie in that gap, and for various technical reasons we may now be experiencing one of those.

… The new President must be prepared to immediately take action after inauguration. There is no time for the usual drill: search for staff, redecorate the Oval Office, have meet-and-greets so the new officials get to know each other, schedule meetings to formulate a plan and build support. The damage to the economy will be terrible by that time these things are completed, and (worst case) the economy still might be sliding downwards. Also, any plans will require time for Congressional approval and implementation, and plus lag times until results appear.

Then there is is the bad news. The conventional solutions which the new Administration could easily put into effect — fiscal and monetary stimuli, plus devaluation of the dollar to stimulate exports — probably will not work (in the sense of sparking a recovery of the economy). Let’s defer the reasons why until a later post, and consider the implications.

… These are {recommendations for President Obama} to do, not arranged in a sequential order. … We do not know if these things are even possible, esp (2). An unprecedented crisis requires extraordinary responses.

Status report on the financial crisis: we’re at a critical point in time, 10 October 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

An economic downturn has 3 stages, each with a different goal.

First Aid — Stabilize the financial system to avoid a depression. {UPDATE: TOO LATE; WE MISSED THIS WINDOW}
Treatment — apply fiscal and monetary stimuli to mitigate suffering during the recession and get a global recovery in 2010.
Recovery — restructuring and reforms to prepare for the expansion after 2010, and the new world beyond that.
Yes, 2010 is the earliest reasonable date for a recovery IMO from the most severe global downturn since WWII. Policy errors could length the downturn, of course.

The economy is in shock. The effects of this will soon become visible, 11 October 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

This is like Cardiogenic shock, caused by the failure of the heart to pump effectively. The US economy went into cardiac arrest early last week, as the flow of money (the blood” of the economy) slowed due to a near-collapse of the financial system (its “heart”, but not its soul). If not restarted, the economy will slide into a depression (GDP decline of 10% or more) in a few weeks (perhaps months).

The coming collapse in business spending - made visible today, 15 October 2008:

Smart managers react quickly and strongly to changed conditions. Unfortunately, when those conditions are a systemic event visible and affecting everyone their actions re-enforce the event. Positive feedback. This creates much of the business cycle’s volatility, the big swings. The “dampeners” of Keynesian economics, contra-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy, fight these in order to maintain equilibrium.

The US economy must go to Defcon 1, 13 November 2008 {Note: we did almost nothing}:

Summary: We are on the brink of an economic disaster like nothing since the 1930’s. Here is a sketches (nothing more), of guesses as to what we can look forward to. While the past guesses on this site have proven accurate, these might prove too pessimistic. Or too optimistic.

… {After the financial crisis} the effects ripple from the virtual economy (financial markets) to the real economy. Americans have reduced their spending. Hundreds of companies around the world have announced falling revenue — and responded with cutbacks in employment and capital expenditures. Tens of thousands are doing the same, but outside the media spotlight. Most of this will hit in the early months of 2009. We must move the US to Defcon One, a war-like mobilization of resources.

Situation report: global economy, December 2008, 19 December 2008:

Viewpoints about the crisis have coalesced into three camps.

The “normal global recession” camp. Just another cycle, US GDP down perhaps -3% peak to trough.
The “worst recession since the 1930’s” camp. A bad scene, but the world’s governments are now on the job. Fiscal and monetary policy will do the job, again. US GDP down 5% or so. See this example.
The “worse than worst” scenario. Government policy might not work — or it might work but only with long lags. Uncertainty rules; the outcome is unknowable.
Those in the first two camps believe that the worst of the crisis has passed in that its course now runs in familiar channels. The small minority in the third camp believes that the world has changed. The post-WWII is ending.

Tri-Chronic Dimensional Geometric Logic and Tri-Spatial Ergodic Intuitionistic Perception

coming soon...